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MANUAL OF ETHICS. By J. S. Mackenzie, M. A. Second edition. London: W. B. Clive & Co., 1894.

Mr. Mackenzie's "Manual of Ethics" appears in a second edition with some supplementary notes, which are added in a second appendix. The most important are those which deal with "Ethics as a Science" and "Self-assertion and Self-denial." In the former, Mr. Mackenzie had perhaps in view the criticisms of some previous reviewers. As one of them, I should find nothing to object to in this further statement of his position if we were allowed to amend the sentence in which he says that it is the function of Ethics to enlighten us "with respect to the principles of which common sense *is to be* guided in its practical judgments," by reading "*is* guided." It is true, as Mr. Mackenzie observes, that common sense is not an oracle, but neither is Ethics, and if we had to select between them as our guide and enlightener in practical judgments most of us know which we should choose. The note on "Self-assertion and Self-denial" calls in Professor James's distinction between the "I," or microcosm, which includes my whole world, and the "Me," which is merely one of the many objects or persons within that world to explain how the "assertion" of the former may involve the "denial" of the latter. This is a valuable distinction in psychology. I am not so sure as Mr. Mackenzie that it is equally valuable in Ethics. Here the point is, that the moral life is a continual progress from a narrower to a wider "I." The latter is not something different from the former. It is already contained in it. To release or realize the true I, the false I must be broken up and its elements recombined. On the other hand, the only justification for breaking into the old self is the development of the new out of the same elements. All this, however, is implied by Mr. Mackenzie, and I have no real quarrel with him over this admirable section. He does not seem to me to be so clear when he goes on to deal with these two formulæ as different ways of expressing the ideal of moral conduct. "Self-assertion means devotion to that circle of interests with which we have specially identified ourselves. Self-denial means the renunciation of this with a view to some other circle in which our interest is less keen." This, to begin with, suggests a difficulty. In view of the analysis of the preceding paragraph, how (we are inclined to ask) is this renunciation possible? Unless I am in some way *more* interested in the other circle, unless, in other words, the other circle is more attractive to

me, how can I renounce my present circle for it? The difference surely between the act which we call self-denying and that which we call self-assertive cannot depend merely on the relative keenness of interest in the selves that are asserted or denied. But passing this over, the "real distinction," and we may add the real difficulty, appears when we consider the apparently contradictory ideals corresponding respectively to the two formulæ which, in our ordinary moral judgment, we seem to approve, and ask in respect to them which of them is supreme? Are we to "make the best of ourselves," or are we, at the expense of our best selves, to make for the best world for others? Mr. Mackenzie's answer seems to be that this is a difficulty affecting practice in which Ethics has nothing to say. Ethics has done its part when it defines the ideal as "the realization of a completely rational universe." Perhaps he is right; but had he been less pressed for space, we might have expected from him some hints as to the considerations which under modern conditions may help us in its practical solution. Thus it seems obvious that, as a rule, the man of greater social utility in these times is not the man who at an early stage has exercised strict self-restraint in the matter of his predominating interests, but the man who has made the best use of his opportunities to acquire knowledge and experience in the field in which his talents lie, and to which therefore presumably inclination points. This, however, is the one (unavoidable) defect of this excellent manual: that it does not give more.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

DER ENTWICKELUNGSGANG DER KANTISCHEN ETHIK BIS ZUR KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT. Von Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, D.Ph. Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1894. Pp. 106.

The author of the present treatise is a son of the founder and leader of the German Society for Ethical Culture (the Berlin astronomer, Professor William Foerster), and a pupil of the Freiburg philosopher, Professor Aloys Riehl. His acute, laborious, and thorough work is a valuable contribution to the better understanding of Kant. With the data heretofore existing, one could hardly form an idea of the continuity in the development of the Kantian ethics, and it rather seemed as if Kant's practical philosophy were divided into two sharply-marked periods, the first of which was ruled by eudemonism, whilst the second rejected this principle as the opposite of morality. Dr. Foerster has made use